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Internet Radio Disparity: The Need for
Greater Equity in the Copyright Royalty
Payment Structure
Jessica L. Bagdanov*
INTRODUCTION
When Radiohead released the album “In Rainbows” in 2007,
they provided a downloadable version on the band’s website for
which buyers could pay whatever price they wanted, even zero.1
Commentators noted, “[f]or the beleaguered recording business
Radiohead has put in motion the most audacious experiment in
years.”2 Although some fans downloaded the album for free,
many paid money for it,3 and the album made more money than
the band’s two previous albums combined, which were never
offered for free.4 Not many musical artists could get away with
the creative antics of Radiohead,5 but this novel marketing

* J.D. candidate 2011 Chapman University School of Law. B.A. 2007 Westmont
College. I am incredibly grateful to Chapman University School of Law Professors Heidi
Brown and John Tehranian for their thoughtful editorial input on this Comment; to my
colleagues on Chapman Law Review for their tireless efforts and hours of work; also to my
parents, Doug and Connie Baird, for always encouraging me to pursue what inspires me;
and finally, to my husband, Tim Bagdanov, for his unfailing love and constant support.
1 Jon Pareles, Pay What You Want for This Article, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, (Arts
& Leisure), at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/arts/music/09pare.html
?ex=1354856400&en=ec2f1c29937292be&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagew
anted=all.
2 Id.
3 About sixty-two percent of those who downloaded “In Rainbows” paid nothing;;
seventeen percent paid between one cent and four dollars; twelve percent paid between
eight and twelve dollars; six percent paid between four dollars and eight dollars; and four
percent paid between twelve and twenty dollars. Greg Sandoval, Free beats fee for
Radiohead’s ‘In Rainbows’, CNET NEWS BLOG (Nov. 5, 2007, 11:30 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9811013-7.html. However, Radiohead produced the
album independently and was not sharing revenue with its old record label, EMI. Id.
4 Eric Pfanner, Radiohead Blazes a Marketing Trail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/business/media/24iht-cache24.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=
radiohead&st=cse.
5 Steven Corn noted that Radiohead already had an extremely loyal fan base when
they released “In Rainbows” as a pay-what-you-want download, and that it would not be
so easy for smaller, less visible music groups. Steven Corn, The Digital Lowdown,
ROYALTY WEEK, Oct. 30, 2007, at 7, available at http://www.aarcroyalties.com/new/media/
royalty_week_103007.pdf.
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strategy demonstrates the changing nature of the recording
industry and illustrates that record labels may need to change
their business models in order to stay afloat in an industry
driven by Internet streaming and advertising. Thom Yorke, lead
singer of Radiohead, said to Time Magazine, “I like the people at
our record company, but the time is at hand when you have to
ask why anyone needs one. And, yes, it probably would give us
some perverse pleasure to say ‘F___ you’ to this decaying
business model.”6
The introduction of the Internet brought new ways for music
lovers to listen to their favorite artists without having to
purchase full albums. New methods of broadcasting music, such
as Internet7 and satellite radio,8 changed the face of radio and
broadcast licensing.9 Musical recordings began to stream online
“by transmissions that are akin to radio broadcasts over the
Internet, whether to the public at large or directly to individuals
upon request, called webcasting.”10 Many record companies and
other musical copyright holders became concerned that copyright
laws could not sufficiently protect their copyrighted content11 and
that such entities and individuals would lose large percentages of
revenue due to Internet radio and piracy.12 Indeed, the recording
industry has suffered financially due to the digital age.13 It has
been noted, however, that if properly managed, Internet radio

6 Josh Tyrangiel, Radiohead Says: Pay What You Want, TIME (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1666973,00.html.
7 Simply defined, Internet radio is the “continuous transmission of streaming audio
over the Internet.” ERIC LEE, HOW INTERNET RADIO CAN CHANGE THE WORLD 11 (2005).
8 Satellite radio stations, like Sirius and XM Radio, broadcast crystal clear music
from satellites in space and are often offered on a subscription basis. See generally What
is XM, XM RADIO, http://www.xmradio.com/whatisxm/index.xmc (last visited Sept. 29,
2010). This Comment is solely focused, however, on the legal issues pertaining to
Internet radio, and does not provide legal insight into the realm of satellite radio.
9 See generally MICHAEL C. KEITH, THE RADIO STATION (8th ed. 2010).
10 Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery, 20 ENT.
L. REP. 4, 4 (1998). “Webcasting” and “Internet radio” are used interchangeably
throughout this paper. Internet radio is one type of webcasting. Some webcasters are
companies that operate Federal Communications Commission-licensed radio stations and
stream their programming over both the Internet and traditional AM/FM stations, and
others broadcast solely over the Internet. Cydney A. Tune & Christopher R. Lockard,
Navigating the Tangled Web of Webcasting Royalties, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW., no. 3, 2009
at 20.
11 Kohn, supra note 10.
12 Andrey Spektor, How “Choruss” Can Turn Into a Cacophony: The Record
Industry’s Stranglehold on the Future of Music Business, 16 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6–8
(2009), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v16i1/article3.pdf.
13 The recording industry brought in forty billion dollars in annual sales ten years
ago, and now it only brings in half of that. Brad Stone & Claire Cain Miller, Music
Forecast: In a Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/technology/internet/16tune.html?dbk.
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may also be a significant way for record companies to increase
record sales.14 Kurt Hanson, founder and CEO of AccuRadio (a
small online radio site),15 explained, “Internet radio is one of the
few bright spots in the music industry, giving airplay to dozens of
genres and thousands of artists that never received airplay
before.”16 Although not a perfect substitute for purchasing
music, webcasting makes it easier for listeners to buy music from
artists they like than other forms of radio do.17
The major issue in the statutory regulation of Internet radio
has been the performance right: who has one, who should get one
and how much it should cost.18 Those who own a “performance
right” are entitled to receive royalties whenever someone else—
like a webcaster—broadcasts the copyrighted material.19
Throughout recent history, copyright law related to performance
rights has changed dramatically.20 Although the current system
has continued to achieve significant improvements, is still unfair
to webcasters. While terrestrial broadcast radio stations pay
minimal royalties for the music they play,21 webcasters often
must pay at least twenty-five percent of their yearly revenue in
royalties.22
This Comment advocates for a more balanced

14 “Online listening has become an increasingly valuable outlet for music companies
and artists. Internet radio services can appeal to niche audiences by tailoring individual
streams, and they feature independent artists who might never get played on broadcast
stations.” Claire Cain Miller, Music Labels Reach Deal With Internet Radio Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2009, at B2. See also David Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Releases
Music Royalties for Internet Radio Streaming for 2006–2010, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE
LLP (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.dwt.com/LearningCenter/Advisories?find=24816.
15 AccuRadio purports to currently reach approximately four-hundred thousand
listeners per month, compared to forty million Pandora users reported for 2009. Compare
The AccuRadio Story, ACCURADIO, http://www.accuradio.com/aboutaccuradio/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2010), with Alexandra Osorio, Has Pandora Finally Arrived? Latest Stats Looking
Quite Impressive, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
stories/121609pandora.
16 Miller, supra note 14.
17 Webcasting is not a complete substitute for purchasing music, although it has
certainly posed a threat to the recording industry. In most cases, webcasting services do
not allow a user to choose a particular song at a particular time. The user may choose a
specific genre, or a type of music preferred, but is left with a playlist of music chosen at
random by the programming of the webcasting service. See, e.g., PANDORA RADIO,
http://www.pandora.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). For a very detailed account of how a
webcasting service akin to Pandora scientifically works, see Arista Records LLC v.
Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 162–64 (2nd Cir. 2009).
18 Robert Ashton, Artists vs Radio: America’s Battle Royal for Royalties, MUSIC
WEEK, Jan. 19, 2008, at 14. See also Part I, infra, which discusses the difference between
a musical work and a sound recording, and the statutory process of granting both
copyrights a performance right.
19 See infra Part I.
20 See infra Part I.
21 See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part II.
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structure, where Internet radio is less-heavily burdened,
especially considering the significant advertisement advantages
it has over other forms of broadcast radio.
In order to fully understand the problems associated with
the current structure of broadcast copyright laws, particularly as
applied to Internet radio, one must appreciate the history of the
law and its evolution over time. Part I of this Comment provides
an overview of current copyright law applicable to webcasting
and Internet radio.23 Part II discusses current royalty rate
structures that apply to different webcasting business models.
Part III notes the unfairness of the current rate structure and
discusses new issues it must face because of the continued
advancement of technology. Finally, Part IV proposes that to
create a more balanced system, Congress should pass the
Performance Rights Act, which would amend current copyright
law to require terrestrial broadcast stations to compensate
artists, just like all other mediums of radio broadcasting.24 The
Act should require that SoundExchange25 create an opt-out
database where artists can waive royalty payments.26 Hence,
while actually raising royalty revenue coming to artists with the
Performance Rights Act, broadcasters could enjoy an efficient
way to reduce royalty payments.
I. CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW APPLICABLE TO WEBCASTING AND
INTERNET RADIO
Regulation of Internet radio, like other copyright issues,
derives from the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).27 Two
amendments to the Copyright Act significantly determined the
future of Internet radio and webcasting: the Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act of 199528 and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.29 This statutory framework,

23 This Comment does not purport to provide an exhaustive account of copyright law
or even a complete explanation of all copyright issues pertaining to the Internet. Rather,
the sole purpose of this Comment is to explore the law surrounding and governing
Internet radio.
24 See infra Part IV.A.
25 SoundExchange is “an independent, nonprofit performance rights organization”
that acts as the sole collection agency of statutory royalties on behalf of featured artists
and the owners of sound recording copyrights. The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB)
appointed SoundExchange to collect and distribute these digital performance royalties.
SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://soundexchange.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
26 See infra Part IV.B.
27 The Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 on
Oct. 19, 1976, and is codified in Title 17 of the United States Code.
28 See infra Part I.B.
29 See infra Part I.C.
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set in place long before webcasting existed, determines the
methods used to calculate royalty rates and licensing schemes for
the new business models of the twenty-first century.
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
Section 102 of the Copyright Act grants copyright protection
to works that are categorized as, among other things,30 “musical
works”31 and “sound recordings.”32 A “musical work” refers to the
notes and lyrics of a song,33 whereas a “sound recording” results
from “the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other
sounds.”34 A song that is sung and performed by an artist
constitutes a sound recording, whereas the person who wrote the
song is the creator of a musical work.35 While the holder of a
musical work copyright retains a right of performance—meaning
the person will be paid in royalties whenever that composition is
performed—the holder of a sound recording right will not.36 As a
consequence of this lack of protection, other artists may perform
their own versions of a musical work and thereby produce their
own sound recording.37 Often a record label owns the copyright
in a sound recording,38 and the composer of the piece assigns his
30 Section 102 also affords copyright protection to literary works, dramatic works,
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion
pictures, and other audiovisual works and architectural works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1),
(3)–(6), (8) (2006).
31 § 102(a)(2).
32 § 102(a)(7) (2010).
33 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records, 72 Fed.
Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
34 17 U.S.C. § 101.
35 “For example, in the piece ‘Let It Be’ recorded by the Beatles, only John Lennon
and Paul McCartney originally held a ‘musical work’ copyright as the song’s composers,
while John, Paul, Ringo Starr and George Harrison all originally held a ‘sound recording’
copyright as performers of the recorded work.” Paul Musser, The Internet Radio Equality
Act: A Needed Substantive Cure for Webcasting Royalty Standards and Congressional
Bargaining Chip, 8 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 1, 5 (2009).
36 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 24,086.
37 Id. For a practical example of the relationship between a musical work and a
sound recording, and the impact of the distinction on performance rights, see Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 259, 272–73 (2007).
38 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 24,086. Sound recording copyright owners are typically record labels, and they
have the right to license the public performance of a sound recording by means of a digital
audio transmission. What is a Sound Recording Copyright Owner, SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://soundexchange.com/category/faq/general-questions/#question-454 (last visited Oct.
1, 2009). The “Big Four” music companies—Universal, Sony/BMG, Warner, and Electric
& Musical Industries Ltd. (EMI)—have both record label and music publishing arms.
About EMI, http://www.emi.com/page/emi/AboutEMI (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). For
example, EMI Group’s record labels include Capitol and Virgin, and its New Music
department “finds and develops new, exciting and successful music.” Id. Its music
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interest in the musical work to a music publisher in exchange for
a continued interest in royalties drawn from it.39
Under section 102 today, licensing revenues for both musical
works and sound recordings flow whenever such items are sold as
compact discs (CDs) or Internet downloads, or when they are
used in television and Internet commercials.40 Revenues also
accrue for a musical work when it is “performed publicly through
radio, television, and Internet broadcasting . . . and venues of
every kind where music is played.”41 However, no similar
performance right generated licensing revenues for holders of
sound recording rights under the Copyright Act until 1995.42
Essentially, if a song was broadcasted over the radio, the
composer enjoyed copyright compensation, but the artist
performing the song and the record label did not.43 The
commencement of the digital age, specifically the ability to
stream music over the Internet, posed a serious financial threat
to record labels by offering consumers a replacement for
purchasing compact discs.44 In response, copyright holders—
specifically artists holding sound recording rights—looked to
Congress for more protection of their ownership rights.

publishing arm “is in the business of acquiring, protecting, administering and exploiting
the rights in musical compositions.” Id. Active songwriters under EMI Music Publishing
include Amy Winehouse, Kanye West and Jay-Z. Id.
39 AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 408 (3d ed. 2002). According
to the Music Publishers Association, a music publisher seeks out new and talented
songwriters and composers and supports them as they develop their talents. A music
publisher is also responsible for distributing copyright royalties to its supported
songwriters and composers. See What is Music Publishing?, MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASS’N
ONLINE, http://www.mpaonline.org.uk/FAQ (click “What is Music Publishing?”) (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010).
40 Kevin C. Parks, Black Hole or Celestial Jukebox? Section 114 and the Future of
Music, 1 LANDSLIDE, no. 2, 2008 at 46, 47.
41 Id.
42 See infra Part I.B. Historically, radio broadcasters opposed the recognition of a
performance right in sound recording copyrights. See Musser, supra note 35, at 5–6.
43 Steven M. Marks, Entering the Sound Recording Performance Right Labyrinth:
Defining Interactive Services and the Broadcast Exemption, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 309,
310 (2000). Historically, this inequity between the musical work and sound recording
copyrights “was maintained by virtue of the powerful lobbying efforts of the broadcasting
industry . . . which successfully resisted legislation that would have cost its members
much in the way of additional operating costs by imposing a requirement that
performance royalties be paid to labels and recording artists.” Parks, supra note 40, at 48.
See also Musser, supra note 35, at 5.
44 See Parks, supra note 40, at 48.
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B. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act45
In 1995, Congress granted sound recording copyright owners
a limited right of public performance in the Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA).46 Congress finally
recognized that the then-current state of the Copyright Act did
not sufficiently protect such copyright holders from commercial
exploitation.47 The congressional committee in charge intended
to “control the distribution of [copyright holders’] product by
digital transmissions . . . without imposing new and
unreasonable burdens on radio and television broadcasters,
which often promote, and appear to pose no threat to, the
distribution of sound recordings.”48 The statute provides in
pertinent part:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of a copyright under
[Title 17 of the United States Code] has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following . . . in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.49

The purpose of the DPRA was to ensure that performing
artists, record companies and others “whose livelihood depends
upon effective copyright protection for sound recordings, [would]
be protected as new technologies affect the ways in which their
creative works are used.”50
The DPRA created a limited right, rather than an exclusive
right, to transmissions51 in order to balance various “industry
interests.”52 It also created a compulsory license for certain

45 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995 (DPRA), Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
46 See Kohn, supra note 10, at 6; Musser, supra note 35, at 6.
47 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 362. The
“copyright holders” referred to by the DPRA are holders of sound recording copyrights,
rather than musical work rights, which have enjoyed significant protection since the
original Copyright Act of 1976. See supra Part I.A.
48 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15.
49 DPRA § 2; 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006).
50 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 10.
51 Congress created a “limited public performance right exclusive to the digital
medium.” Musser, supra note 35, at 6. It shied away from creating an exclusive right of
public performance because Congress wanted to ensure that the new act would not
unnecessarily infringe on the performance of musical works. Id. See also S. REP. NO. 104128, at 16.
52 W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music
Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 850 (2007). The DPRA attempted to balance the
interests of the Copyright Office, record producers, performers, music composers,
publishers, and broadcasters “without upsetting the longstanding business and
contractual relationships” between these entities. S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 13.

Do Not Delete

142

12/12/2010 8:00 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:135

transmissions, depending on the type of service provided.53
Although it gave the exclusive right of performance to sound
recording copyright holders, the DPRA created a complex “threetiered system,”54 categorizing license requirements into separate
rates for: (1) interactive services, (2) non-interactive subscription
transmissions,
and
(3) non-subscription
digital
audio
transmissions of sound recordings.55
The DPRA tailored
licensing requirements to these different types of service
providers, depending on the likelihood of an effect on record
sales56 or on the likelihood that “infringing reproductions” would
be created.57
Owners of interactive services58 are responsible for the most
stringent level of copyright licensing requirements and cannot
receive a compulsory license.59 The DPRA defined an interactive
service as “one that enables a member of the public to
receive . . . on request . . . a transmission of a particular sound
recording . . . selected by or on behalf of the recipient.”60
Interactive services do not qualify for the simple statutory license
structure “because of the ability of listeners to select specific
music that will be included in the stream . . . .”61 Instead, they
must negotiate performance licenses with both the owners of the
copyrights in the transmitted musical compositions and also the
owners of the sound recordings.62
Non-interactive transmissions63 are subject to compulsory
licensing64 only if they conform to specific statutory require53 A “compulsory license” means that if a webcaster meets specific statutory
requirements, it may use a particular sound recording without having to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder, so long as it pays a statutory rate. Tune &
Lockard, supra note 10, at 21.
54 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (E.D. Pa. 2001);; Cardi,
supra note 52, at 850.
55 Cardi, supra note 52, at 850–52.
56 Bonneville Int’l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
57 Cardi, supra note 52, at 850.
58 Grooveshark is a good example of an interactive service. It lets a user choose a
particular song to hear on request, and the user may personalize song playlists. See
Grooveshark, http://www.grooveshark.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
59 Musser, supra note 35, at 8.
60 Marks, supra note 43, at 313 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7))).
61 Oxenford, supra note 14.
62 Cardi, supra note 52, at 851. See also Kellen Myers, The RIAA, the DMCA, and
the Forgotten Few Webcasters: A Call for Change in Digital Copyright Royalties, 61 FED.
COMM. L. J. 431, 440 (2009).
63 In a non-interactive service, a user may not choose a specific song and have it
played immediately, but rather a user can choose a genre of music one prefers. Spektor,
supra note 12, at 29. Pandora is a good example of a non-interactive transmission
because, although it allows limited control over which artists and songs a user hears, it
does not allow users to choose “more than three tracks from the same album or more than
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ments;65 otherwise, they must negotiate privately with sound
recording copyright holders just like interactive services are
required to do.66 If private negotiations fail between these
entities, an arbitration panel organized by the Copyright Office67
determines the royalty rate for the compulsory license.68 It is
this compulsory license that allows Internet services to use
legally recorded sound recordings in their webcasts69 without
seeking permission directly from the copyright owners.70
Non-subscription digital audio transmissions71 of sound
recordings are those not controlled or limited to certain
recipients72 and are totally exempt from the sound recording
performance right.73 This third type of transmission constitutes
the most important exemption in the DPRA74 and includes radio
and television broadcasts that are “available free of charge”75 to

four tracks by one recording artist.” Myers, supra note 62, at 440. See also Arista Records
LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 154 (2d. Cir. 2009). This case dealt with the
webcasting service LAUNCHcast which is similar to Pandora, and the Second Circuit
held that, as a matter of law, LAUNCHcast was not an interactive service within the
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 114. Id. at 164.
64 See supra note 53 for an explanation of “compulsory licensing.”
65 Such requirements include that the service not be interactive, not pre-announce
the broadcast of a particular song, and must include information about the recording
broadcasted. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C); Tune and Lockard, supra note 10, at 21–22.
66 See Allison Kidd, Recent Development, Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio
Community: A Call for a Legislative Band-Aid, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 339, 348 (2003).
67 Arbitrations of this kind were completed through a Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panel (CARP) when Congress enacted the DPRA. See Amy Duvall, Note, Royalty RateSetting for Webcasters: A Royal(ty) Mess, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 271
(2008). However, the rate-setting process was reexamined in 2004, and Congress passed
the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act (CRDRA), which replaced the CARP
adjudicators with a full-time, three-judge panel, now known as the Copyright Royalty
Board (CRB), which currently sets royalty rates. Id. at 278.
68 Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg.
77,292, 77,294 (Dec. 11. 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
69 David Oxenford, SoundExchange to Audit Internet Radio Royalty Payments of
Last.FM—What is the Value of Music?, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Mar. 28, 2008)
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2008/03/articles/internet-radio/soundexchange-to-auditinternet-radio-royalty-payments-of-lastfm-what-is-the-value-of-music/.
70 Cydney Tune, Webcaster Music Royalty Rates—in Flux and on the Rise, 1401
CLIENT ALERT 1, 1 (June 15, 2007), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/
5EA3137178E2E2204487E5B973E75B47.pdf.
71 Examples include local AM/FM radio stations, some Internet radio stations, and
television broadcasts. Emily D. Harwood, Note, Staying Afloat in the Internet Stream:
How to Keep Web Radio from Drowning in Digital Copyright Royalties, 56 FED. COMM. L.
J. 673, 680 (2004).
72 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 16 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356; Kohn,
supra note 10, at 12.
73 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
74 H. R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995); S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 16.
75 Harwood, supra note 71, at 680.
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the public. Non-subscription transmissions include “any transmission that is not a subscription transmission.”76
This complex method for determining licensing requirements
and royalty rates became even more difficult for new companies
to navigate after the rising popularity and sophistication of the
Internet in and after 1998,77 and copyright holders again called
for greater copyright protection—as well as clarification—from
Congress.
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted
in October of 199878 in response to claims that the DPRA did not
adequately respond to the application of royalty rates to Internet
radio.79
Record companies and the Recording Industry of
America Association (RIAA) expressed concerns that labels were
not sufficiently protected from Internet piracy under the DPRA.80
Since webcasters were not included in the DPRA provisions,
“webcasters and the recording industry fought over whether
webcasters should qualify for the limited public performance
right or be treated as an interactive service” and be required to
negotiate privately with copyright holders.81 Specifically, the
recording industry and the RIAA complained that webcasting
services of the non-subscription nature diminished record sales,
cut into profits, and hindered growth of the recording industry.82
Convinced, Congress enacted the DMCA in line with its historical
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(9) (2006).
The late 1990s saw a rapid growth and improvement in webcasting and streaming
technologies. Myers, supra note 62, at 438.
78 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998),
codified in part in 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2006).
79 Kidd, supra note 66, at 349.
80 Arista Records LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d. Cir. 2009). This
recent case constitutes one of the more in-depth judicial analyses of the DMCA, relating it
to a specific non-subscription webcasting service, LAUNCHcast. After the ruling, P2P
defense lawyer Ray Beckerman “thanked” Sony BMG music for appealing the trial court
decision, claiming that the Second Circuit’s determination that, as a matter of law,
LAUNCHcast was not interactive, created a “safe harbor for a whole industry and
business model.” Ray Beckerman, RIAA Loses Its Case Against Yahoo’s Launch Media
Internet Radio Station Provider, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE PEOPLE BLOG (Aug. 22,
2009), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2009/08/riaa-loses-its-case-againstyahoos.html.
81 Duvall, supra note 67, at 272.
82 Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 154. See also Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting
Music Revolution is Ready to Begin, as Soon as We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The
Story of the Music Industry at War With Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 12
(2001). With the DMCA, Congress targeted services like Napster, which provide users
with “a degree of predictability—based on choices made by the user—that approximates
the predictability the music listener seeks when purchasing music.” Arista Records, 578
F.3d at 161.
76
77
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policy of “preventing the diminution in record sales through
outright piracy of music or new digital media that offered
listeners the ability to select music in such a way that they would
forego purchasing records.”83 The DMCA expanded the class of
transmissions that are subject to compulsory licenses, namely
the non-interactive subscription services.84 Although “Congress
did not alter the section 114(d)(1)(A) exemption for
‘nonsubscription broadcast transmission[s],’”85 the newly
expanded category subject to compulsory licenses included
services previously categorized as non-subscription broadcasts.86
Some webcasts were no longer considered part of the third
category exempt from statutory licenses.87 With this expansion,
Congress was merely trying to “clarify that webcasters are
subject to the sound recording performance right.”88 Indeed, the
DMCA left webcasters “clearly subject to royalty payments.”89
The DMCA amended the Copyright Act to broaden the sound
performance right to include a more expansive definition of an
“interactive service” as it pertains to individual licensing.90 As
webcasting continued to gain popularity, the DPRA’s definition of
“interactive service” began to break down.91 Section 114 of the
Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 157 (emphasis added).
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769 (E. D. Pa. 2001);; Brian
Flavin, Recent Development, A Digital Cry for Help: Internet Radio’s Struggle to Survive a
Second Royalty Rate Determination Under the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard, 27
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 427, 436 (2008).
85 Bonneville Int’l. Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 769 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)).
86 Id. An eligible non-subscription transmission is defined in the DMCA as follows:
A noninteractive nonsubscription digital audio transmission not exempt under
subsection (d)(1) that is made as part of a service that provides audio
programming consisting, in whole or in part, or performances of sound
recordings, including retransmissions of broadcast transmissions, if the
primary purpose of the service is to provide to the public such audio or other
entertainment programming, and the primary purpose of the service is not to
sell, advertise, or promote particular products or services other than sound
recordings, live concerts, or other music-related events.
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6) (2006). This definition is synonymous with the definition of
“commercial webcaster” provided by SoundExchange. See Commercial Webcaster,
SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://soundexchange.com/service-provider/service-category/im-notsure-help-me-figure-it-out/quiz-commercial-webcaster/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
87 Bonneville Int’l. Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 769. Webcasters had begun offering
custom genre channels of sound recordings while still maintaining a non-subscription
relationship with users. Id.
88 Marks, supra note 43, at 327.
89 Spektor, supra note 12, at 10.
90 Stephen Kramarsky, Second Circuit Finds Internet Radio Not Interactive Service,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 2009, at 5.
91 Marks, supra note 43, at 314. For example, some services “allowed users to create
their own programs by selecting and rating particular artists,” and hence could create
personalized programs in ways that were not anticipated by the intent of “interactive”
when Congress enacted the DPRA. Id.
83
84
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DMCA addressed the perceived deficiency in the DPRA,
providing:
An ‘interactive service’ is one that enables a member of the public to
receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient,
or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether
or not as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the
recipient.92

This definition altered what the DPRA considered
“interactive” because it no longer required a user to have a
personal choice in what songs are played throughout a webcast.
As long as “the user has influenced the program in such way that
the ‘recipient might identify certain artists that become the basis
of the personal program,’”93 the service would be considered
interactive within the meaning of the statute.94 Internet radio
webcasts, however, do not typically fall under the DMCA
definition of “interactive service”95 and are either subject to the
compulsory licensing scheme determined by the Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP),96 or must privately negotiate
with copyright holders. CARP was supposed to “establish rates
and terms that most clearly represent[ed] the rates and terms
that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a

17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(D)(7) (2006).
Michael Lang, Comment, The Regulation of Shrink-Wrapped Radio: Implications
of Copyright on Podcasting, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 463, 481 (2006) (quoting H. R.
Rep. No. 105-796, at 87 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)).
94 A service would be interactive if it
allowed a small number of individuals to request that sound recordings be
performed in a program specially created for that group and not available to
any individuals outside of that group. In contrast, a service would not be
interactive if it merely transmitted to a large number of recipients of the
service’s transmissions a program consisting of sound recordings requested by
a small number of those listeners.
H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-796, at 87–88, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639 (1998). Compare
this explanation with that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Arista
Records, 578 F.3d at 162–64.
95 The definition of “interactive service” states:
The ability of individuals to request that particular sound recordings be
performed for reception by the public at large . . . does not make a service
interactive, if the programming on each channel of the service does not
substantially consist of sound recordings that are performed within 1 hour of
the request.
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7). See also Duvall, supra note 67, at n.182. Pandora, for example, does
not allow a user to choose the next song on his current channel, but the user may skip
songs or approve of songs to “shape future listening.” Id.
96 CARP was established to facilitate arbitration between broadcasters and sound
recording copyright holders. Recall that the CRB currently oversees such negotiations
and sets royalty rates. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
92
93
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willing buyer and a willing seller.”97 The DMCA requires
Internet webcasters to obtain licenses and pay royalties to both
the performance rights organizations98 as well as to the owners of
the copyrights of sound recordings and musical works, because
each of these entities has an ownership right in a given song or
other musical work.99
II. CURRENT ROYALTY RATE STRUCTURE
As we have seen, Internet webcasters—just like other
broadcasters—must pay royalties for the musical recordings
performed on their online stations or channels. This section
considers the most current protections afforded to performance
rights holders by the federal government and explores what
webcasters must pay in royalties to keep their businesses
running. The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB)100 set highly
controversial royalty rates in 2007, and experienced intense
backlash from webcasters as a result.101 More recent attempts to
balance the rate structure for webcasting companies have been
seen as an improvement over the 2007 rates, but are still
questionable and continue to favor other forms of broadcast
radio, such as terrestrial broadcasting stations.102
A. The 2007 Royalty Rates Set by the Copyright Royalty Board
When the DPRA was enacted in 1995, CARP—and
subsequently the CRB103—designated SoundExchange104 as the
administrative agency responsible for collecting and distributing
compulsory performance royalties for sound recording copyright

97 Duvall, supra note 67, at 272 (quoting Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2895–96 (1998)).
98 Tune & Lockard, supra note 10, at 20. The performance rights organizations
(PROs) consist of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP),
Broadcast Music, Inc., and SESAC. Id. These organizations represent all “songwriters,
composers, and music publishers in the United States for purposes of licensing and
collecting royalties from any public performance of a song.” Id.
99 Id.
100 The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) was established by the U.S. Copyright Office
and consists of three full-time copyright royalty judges, whose responsibility it is to “make
determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments as
provided in [17 U.S.C. § 114].” 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2006). For more information on the
CRB and governing laws, see COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD, http://www.loc.gov/crb (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010).
101 See infra Part II.A.
102 See infra Part II.B.
103 See supra notes 67 and 100 for information on the CRB and its predecessors.
104 For information on SoundExchange, see supra note 25.
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holders.105 In March 2007, the CRB, together with SoundExchange, established a new royalty rate system under the
authority of section 114 based on a “per performance”
calculation.106
The system set forth royalty rates107 for
commercial webcasters,108 small commercial webcasters (less
than $1.2 million in revenue per year),109 and noncommercial
webcasters.110 The new rates for commercial webcasters and
small commercial webcasters were set as follows: $0.0008 per
performance for 2006, $0.0011 per performance for 2007, $0.0014
per performance for 2008, $0.0018 per performance for 2009, and
$0.0019 per performance for 2010.111 The CRB also set a $500
minimum fee per channel for broadcasters.112
Under this
structure, small webcasters did not pay different royalty rates
than larger companies.113 In contrast, noncommercial webcasters
were subject to a minimum annual fee of $500 per channel or
station.114 The high rates established for commercial and small
commercial webcasters upset many and resulted in numerous
attempts to negotiate different agreements with Sound-

105 See Susan Butler, CRB Appoints SoundExchange Sole ‘Collective,’ ALLBUSINESS
(Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/miscellaneous-retail-retail-storesnot/4394859-1.html; Oxenford, supra note 14.
106 This means that webcasters must pay royalties based on how many times a given
recording is performed (or played over the stream). For example, if a given recording is
played a total of one hundred times in one year, the webcaster responsible for those
performances would have to pay the given royalty rate times one hundred. See generally
Tune, supra note 70.
107 SoundExchange participates in the royalty rate setting process, either through
voluntary settlements between parties or proceedings before the CRB. See The Law,
SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://soundexchange.com/about/the-law (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). For
more about different types of negotiations between private parties, see supra Part II.B.
108 “Commercial broadcaster” is synonymous with “eligible nonsubscription transmission.” See supra note 86.
109 Tune, supra note 70, at 2.
110 A noncommercial webcaster is one that is exempt from taxation under section 501
of the Internal Revenue Code, or that is operated by a governmental entity, meaning it is
a non-profit organization. Duvall, supra note 67, at 280; Steve Gordon, Update on
Webcasting Royalty Rates: Part Two of Two, ENT. L. & FIN., Sept. 2004, at 3, 3–4,
available at http://www.stevegordonlaw.com/update_webcast_royalty_rates2.htm. Noncommercial webcasters also tend to have different sources of funding, such as listener
donations, corporate sponsorships and university funding. Duvall, supra note 67, at 280.
111 Tune, supra note 70, at 2.
112 Daniel Castro, Internet Radio and Copyright Royalties: Reforming a Broken
System, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 5 (May 10, 2007), http://www.itif.org/files/
InternetRadio.pdf.
113 Id.
114 Tune, supra note 70, at 2.
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Exchange.115 Complaints were not heard, however, because the
CRB quickly rejected all rehearing proposals in April 2007.116
The rate schedule established in 2007 was the product of two
years of litigation between SoundExchange and parties
representing all types of webcasting and broadcasting services,
where the parties appeared and argued before the CRB in order
to determine a fair royalty structure.
The CRB adopted
significant rate increases on the advice of SoundExchange,117
over opposition by numerous digital broadcasters who argued
that the proper structure should calculate royalties due based on
a percentage of revenue, rather than the “per performance”
structure advocated by SoundExchange.118 Webcasters argued
that this effort by SoundExchange was nothing more than a
“major label money grab—an attempt to revive a dying business
model through exorbitant fee increases at the expense of
technological developments and consumer interests.”119 The fees
set by SoundExchange would exceed the total annual revenues
for many Internet radio stations,120 and although large

115 Many webcasting sites argued these unreasonable rates would eat up most of
their revenue and would put Internet radio out of business. Miller, supra note 14. See
also Oxenford, supra note 14.
116 Tune, supra note 70, at 2; Oxenford, supra note 14.
117 SoundExchange argued to the CRB that the per-performance rate for sound
recording copyrights should be calculated based on the willing buyer/willing seller
standards set forth concerning interactive services, whereas webcasters argued the
benchmark should more look like the amount at issue in agreements between
performance rights organizations. The CRB chose SoundExchange’s benchmark, which
constituted a significant jump in per-performance rates. The CRB justified its decision
based on, among other things, its understanding that the interactive webcasting market
was similar in many ways to the non-interactive market. Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,095–96 (May 1,
2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
118 Parks, supra note 40, at 49. The CRB adopted SoundExchange’s position for these
reasons:
(1) [P]er performance rates are directly tied to what is being licensed, (2) ease
of measurement, (3) difficulties in tying revenue fees to the value of the
licensed rights, (4) complexities in determining revenue from mixed format
webcasters, and (5) the basic notion that the more that licensed rights are
used, the more payments should increase in relation to use.
Duvall, supra note 67, at 279.
119 Parks, supra note 40, at 49.
120 Marc Fisher, Day of Silence: Internet Radio Goes Dark, RAW FISHER BLOG (June
26, 2007, 7:05 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/rawfisher/2007/06/day_of_silence_
internet_radio.html. The reasoning behind the determination that many webcasters
would have gone out of business under these rates goes as follows:
[B]ased on a webcaster playing an average of 16 songs per hour, royalties are
1.28 cents per listener-hour (based on 2006 rates). A well-run webcaster might
have sold two radio advertising spots at a profit of 0.6 cents per listener-hour.
In addition to video gateway ads, banner ads, and other web-based advertising,
the total revenue for a well-run webcaster is still only between 1.0 and 1.2
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companies “like AOL may [have been] able to afford the new
rates, many smaller Internet radio stations [would have had] to
shut down. The new rates could [have] actually reduce[d] the
flow of royalties to musicians.”121 For example, after the adoption
of these rates, Radio Paradise,122 a smaller Internet radio site,
faced royalty costs of over 125% of its yearly revenue.123 Even
Pandora—considered to be an Internet radio giant—was on the
verge of shutting down, with royalty fees constituting seventy
percent of its projected revenue of twenty-five million dollars for
2008.124 The uproar over the royalty rates set by SoundExchange
even sparked a “day of silence”125 for Internet radio stations and
channels on June 26, 2007, which was designed to draw attention
to what webcasters envisioned to be the government’s attempt to
kill Internet radio.126
In the ensuing months, webcasters united behind various
legislative proposals to curb the effects of the SoundExchange
rates. These efforts included the Internet Radio Equality Act127
and the Performance Rights Act,128 both of which, however,
cents per listener-hour. Thus, if a webcaster (and this is a well-run webcaster)
must pay 1.28 cents per listener-hour, it is likely to go out of business.
Duvall, supra note 67, at 281; Daniel McSwain, Webcast Royalty Rate Decision
Announced, RADIO AND INTERNET NEWSL. (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.kurthanson.com/
archive/news/030207/index.shtml.
121 Hiawatha Bray, Royalty Hike Could Mute Internet Radio: Smaller Stations Say
Rise Will Be Too Much, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2007, at F1, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2007/03/14/royalty_hike_could_mute_i
nternet_radio/.
122 RADIO PARADISE, http://www.radioparadise.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
123 Eliot Van Buskirk, Royalty Hike Panics Webcasters, WIRED (Mar. 6, 2007),
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/03/72879.
124 Tim
Bajarin, Saving Internet Radio, PC MAG. (Oct. 3, 2008),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2331594,00.asp; Peter Whoriskey, Giant of Internet
Radio Nears Its ‘Last Stand:’ Pandora, Other Webcasters Struggle Under High Song Fees,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2008, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/08/15/AR2008081503367.html.
125 On June 26, 2007, Internet radio stations including Yahoo!, Pandora and
Rhapsody stopped broadcasting for twenty-four hours. Kurt Hanson, A Guide to
Preparing for Tomorrow’s “Day of Silence,” RADIO AND INTERNET NEWSL., June 25, 2007,
http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/062507/index.shtml#Saga.
126 Id.
127 Internet Radio Equality Act, H. R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-2060. The bill intended to nullify
the rate determinations set by the CRB in 2007 and replace them with the same revenuebased royalty balancing test found in section 801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act, currently
used for satellite radio royalty determinations. Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast:
Will the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the
Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 302 (2008).
128 Performance Rights Act, H. R. 4789, 100th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-4789.
This bill intended to
provide platform parity in radio performance rights, establishing a flat annual fee for
royalties and requiring terrestrial broadcasters to pay performance royalties just like
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currently seem to have been abandoned somewhere in the dusty
corners of Congress.129
However, the idea behind the
Performance Rights Act—that terrestrial radio should also be
responsible for royalty payments to copyright holders—is still
being considered in Congress and may become a reality in the
months to come.130 Webcasters have not given up, and since
2007, SoundExchange has continued to entertain other proposals
and negotiations.131
One such negotiation, the Webcaster
Settlement Acts of 2008 and 2009, provided certain webcasters
relief from the exorbitant rates set by the CRB in 2007.
B. SoundExchange 2006–2015 Royalty Agreement Under the
Webcaster Settlement Act
Near the end of 2008, webcasters enjoyed renewed hope that
royalty conflicts would soon dissipate, or at least come to a
reasonable compromise.
Congress passed the Webcaster
Settlement Act in October 2008,132 which gave SoundExchange
and webcasters the opportunity to establish royalty rates for the
performance of sound recordings over the Internet in lieu of
compulsory license rates determined by the CRB.133 Under this
Act, SoundExchange had until February 15, 2009 to reach

satellite and Internet radio sites. Id.; Ashton, supra note 19; Parks, supra note 37, at 51.
Under section 114, broadcast radio is exempt from paying performance royalties. See
supra Part I.C.
129 David Oxenford, Webcaster Settlement Act—What Does it Mean?, BROADCAST LAW
BLOG (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2008/10/articles/internet-radio/
webcaster-settlement-act-what-does-it-mean/. However, the Performance Rights Act
enjoys significantly more support than the Internet Radio Equality Act. See infra Part
IV.A.
130 See infra Part IV.A; David Oxenford, The Broadcast Performance Royalty—Not
Dead Yet, as Senate Judiciary Committee to Hold Hearing on Tuesday, BROADCAST LAW
BLOG (Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/08/articles/broadcastperformance-royalty/the-broadcast-performance-royalty-not-dead-yet-as-senate-judiciarycommittee-to-hold-hearing-on-tuesday/.
131 For example, in August 2007, SoundExchange entered into a settlement
agreement with the Digital Media Association (DiMA) that capped the minimum annual
fee at fifty thousand dollars. Flavin, supra note 79, at 465. Under the 2007 CRB rates,
webcasters had to pay a minimum of five-hundred dollars per year per channel offered,
plus royalties on top of that minimum fee. Id. For many webcasters like Pandora which
offer hundreds of custom channels, this minimum fee would likely be more expensive than
the royalty rates. Id.
132 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (2008).
The original Webcaster Settlement Act amended the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of
2002, which allowed a settlement to bypass a CARP proceeding to set royalty rates
between private parties. Carey, supra note 127, at 308; Oxenford, supra note 129. The
Webcaster Settlement Act adopts the same procedure, except that now, the group settling
must submit the settlement to the CRB to publish it in the Federal Register. Carey, supra
note 127, at 308; Oxenford, supra note 129.
133 See supra Part II.A. See also Parks, supra note 40, at 53.
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agreements with webcasters or groups of webcasters,134 and
webcasters were required to expressly opt out of the CRB royalty
rates set in 2007.135 Although questions arose as to the likelihood
of such settlements actually happening,136 webcasters were
mostly optimistic about this progress. However, SoundExchange
encountered logistical problems in meeting the February 15
deadline,137 and webcasters quickly appealed to Congress for an
extension. The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009138 amended the
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 and gave SoundExchange
thirty additional days to “enter into settlement agreements with
webcasters that would be legally binding on all sound recording
copyright owners.”139
The thirty-day extension seemed to provide just enough time
for successful negotiations to take place. Under the Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2009, SoundExchange and certain “pureplay”140
webcasters reached an alternative agreement for royalty rates in
July 2009, for the period of 2006–2015 (2014 for small pureplay
webcasters).141 Webcasters that run online music for larger
providers are not included.142 This agreement splits pureplay
webcasters into three categories: (1) large, (2) small (defined as
Pub. L. No. 110-435.
Id. See also supra Part II.A.
Webcasters were concerned that negotiations with SoundExchange were unlikely,
because they had not entered into successful negotiations in years and voluntary
settlements may have become difficult to obtain. See Oxenford, supra note 129.
137 For example, negotiations between SoundExchange and DiMA fell through in
February 2009 and did not meet the deadline set by the Webcaster Settlement Act of
2008. Staci D. Kramer, Streaming Music Sites and SoundExchange Fail to Reach Royalty
Deal, PAID CONTENT (Feb. 18, 2009), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-streaming-musicsites-soundexchange-fail-to-reach-roylaty-deal. Members of DiMA included Pandora,
RealNetworks, and MTV. Id. The main disagreement between the parties centered
around paying royalties for streaming music only, versus paying for streaming music as
well as game and software revenue. Id.
138 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 (2009).
139 Tune & Lockard, supra note 10, at 23.
140 “Pureplay” webcasters are those “that are willing to include their entire gross
revenue in a percentage of revenue calculation to determine their royalties.” David
Oxenford, Pureplay Webcasters and SoundExchange Enter Into Deal Under Webcaster
Settlement Act to Offer Internet Radio Royalty Rate Alternative for 2006–2015, BROADCAST
LAW BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/07/articles/internetradio/pureplay-webcasters-and-soundexchange-enter-into-deal-under-webcastersettlement-act-to-offer-internet-radio-royalty-rate-alternative-for-20062015/.
141 Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed.
Reg. 34,796, 34,799 (July 17, 2009). Pureplay webcasters privy to this agreement
included AccuRadio, Digitally Imported, and radioIO. Michael Schmitt, SoundExchange
and “Pureplay” Webcasters Announce 2006–2015 Royalty Agreement, RADIO AND INTERNET
NEWSL. (July 7, 2009, 12:17 PM), http://textpattern.kurthanson.com/articles/719/rain-77soundexchange-and-pure-play-webcasters-reach-royalty-agreement. However, other Internet webcasters like Pandora are eligible to elect the substitute license arrangement. Id.
142 For example, CBS Radio runs online music services for both AOL and Yahoo! and
therefore is not subject to this agreement. Miller, supra note 14.
134
135
136
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those that earn $1.25 million or less), and (3) others that offer
bundled, syndicated, or subscription services.143
Large webcasters are required to pay either a perperformance rate or twenty-five percent of their total revenue,
whichever is higher.144 However, larger webcasters are more
likely to pay royalties on a per-performance basis than a
percentage of revenue, since large webcasters have significantly
higher numbers of users than smaller webcasters.145 Also, large
webcasters must pay a minimum royalty per year of $25,000.146
The deal offers a discounted royalty rate—a nearly fifty percent
discount—compared with the CRB rates of 2007, with the
maximum per-performance rate reaching only $0.0014 by
2015.147 In exchange for this discounted rate, the agreement
requires more stringent reporting requirements148 as well as
revenue sharing.149
Small pureplay webcasters pay the greater of either a
percentage of revenues or a percentage of expenses, ranging
between ten and fourteen percent for the period from 2006 to
2014,150 and “in certain circumstances have less stringent play
list reporting requirements in return for payment of an
additional ‘proxy fee.’”151 Although the Executive Director of
SoundExchange, John Simson, still considers the CRB royalty
rates fair and reasonable,152 he expressed hope that this
experimental revenue sharing model would benefit artists, rights
holders, and webcasters simultaneously.153 Pureplay webcasters
seem satisfied as well and consider this royalty agreement to be a
significant milestone as the first “reasonably viable [deal

Schmitt, supra note 141.
Id.
Id.
74 Fed. Reg. 34,796, 34,799.
Id. This works out to be a dramatic difference in cost compared to the maximum
for the CRB royalty rates, reaching $0.0019 per performance by 2010. See supra Part II.A.
148 The new deal requires webcasters to “provide SoundExchange with census reports
(‘actual recordings played and total listenership’) and retain server logs for at least [four]
years.” Schmitt, supra note 141.
149 This agreement helps pureplay webcasters “grow their businesses and develop
business models while allowing artists and labels to share in the upside potential of
webcasting that is driven by their recordings.” Brian Calhoun, SoundExchange and
“PurePlay” Webcasters Reach Unprecedented Experimental Rate Agreement,
SOUNDEXCHANGE (July 7, 2009), http://soundexchange.com/2009/07/07/soundexchangeand-“pureplay”-webcasters-reach-unprecedented-experimental-rate-agreement/.
150 Schmitt, supra note 141.
151 Calhoun, supra note 149.
152 Id.
153 Id.
143
144
145
146
147
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which] . . . extends for a reasonably-long period of time.”154
However, the new system still contains elements of fundamental
unfairness toward Internet radio that must be addressed before
Internet radio will be able to flourish.
III. DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR DIFFERENT MEDIUMS:
A CONTINUING PROBLEM
Although the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 gave relief to
many webcasters and represents one of the first positive
settlements between SoundExchange and pureplay webcasters,
terrestrial radio still pays nothing in sound recording
performance royalties.155 Internet radio continues to rise in
popularity and will soon infiltrate every aspect of everyday life,
including vehicles and homes.
An exemption in royalty
payments for terrestrial radio is unfair when one considers the
current state of Internet radio and its future.156 Because
terrestrial radio is a continued presence in the transmission of
performances, it should not be treated more favorably than
Internet transmissions.
A. Looking Into the Future
According to Bridge Ratings,157 the number of Internet radio
listeners accessing wirelessly—using a personal computer or cell
phone—will increase to seventy-seven million by 2010.158
Pandora claims to already have thirty percent of its users
connected via broadband cell phones, and the number of
broadband subscribers continues to grow.159 Pandora and other

154 Paul Resnikoff, Pure-Play Webcasters, SoundExchange Work it Out, DIGITAL
MUSIC NEWS (July 7, 2009), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/stories/070709webcaster/
?searchterm=webcaster%20settlement%20act (quoting Kurt Hanson, founder of RAIN
and rate negotiator for AccuRadio). However, everyone was satisfied. See, e.g., Bob Bellin,
Webcasters—Don’t Be Fooled by the New Deal for Performance Royalty, RADIO-INFO.COM
(July 14, 2009), http://www.radio-info.com/sections/1-features/columns/13-on-the-mic/
essays/493-webcasters-dont-be-fooled-by-the-new-deal-for-performance-royalty.
155 See infra Part III.B.
156 This section does not discuss the accompanying issues of satellite radio, which
pays much less in royalties than Internet radio. The debate, in this author’s view, centers
on Internet and terrestrial radio because they are both non-subscription services offered
to the public for free.
157 Bridge Ratings is a media research company that tracks consumer behavior
relating specifically to all types of radio, MP3 players, and even Podcasting. Bridging the
Gap, BRIDGE RATINGS, http://www.bridgeratings.com/about.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
158 The Bridge Ratings Report—The Impact of Wireless Internet, BRIDGE RATINGS
(Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.bridgeratings.com/press_03.21.07-WiFi%20Impact.htm
[hereinafter Impact of Wireless Internet].
159 Stone & Miller, supra note 13, at B1.
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webcasters160 provide Internet radio applications (apps) for
broadband phones that are so advanced that they replace
listening to customized radio stations at a computer.161 The
Apple iPad also provides a free, downloadable Pandora app,
which provides extensive information and advertising for a
musical artist with the touch of a finger.162
Similarly, new vehicles will soon be equipped with digital
and HD radio, which will include Internet radio options.163 New
cars will have Pandora—or other webcasting companies—built
into the car and “bundled with either the price of the car or
services associated with the car.”164 Even if a vehicle does not
have digital or HD radio, an iPhone or other broadband phone
with Internet radio apps can hook into the vehicle’s stereo
system, and the user can listen to Pandora while driving.165 The
adoption of in-car Internet radio seemingly would threaten
traditional, terrestrial radio as well as satellite radio as stable
competition in the years to come.166
However, statistics also show that terrestrial radio listening
has actually increased since 2008, and according to Bridge
Ratings, such growth will continue into 2012.167 Since 2006,
160 Webcasters like Slacker, Imeem, and Last.fm also have similarly advanced cell
phone apps. See, e.g., Paul Bonanos, Imeem’s iPhone App Cometes with Apple on its Own
Hardware, GIGAOM (May 14, 2009, 11:53 AM), http://gigaom.com/2009/05/14/imeemsiphone-app-competes-with-apple-on-its-own-hardware/ (discussing Imeem’s new app that
offers its users radio streaming as well as a “My Music” section that offers access to a
user’s own library of uploaded songs).
161 Eliot Van Buskirk, 5 Ways the Cellphone Will Change How You Listen to Music,
WIRED (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/01/six-ways-cellph/.
162 The iPad has a large High Definition viewing screen, on which a user can read a
large amount of biographical or stylistic information about an artist. It goes further than
other mobile devices have in the past—it provides “more real estate for display
advertising.” Emily Bryson York, Pandora: The iPad is Going to be Better than the iPhone
for Ads, BUS. INSIDER (June 14, 2010, 9:47 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
pandora-ipad-2010-6.
163 W. David Gardner, Ford Vehicles to Get iTunes Tagging, INFORMATIONWEEK (Dec.
29, 2009, 12:18 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/services/data/showArticle.
jhtml?articleID=222100216; Antuan Goodwin, 2010 Car Tech and GPS Preview,
CNET.COM (Dec. 14, 2009, 10:30 AM), http://ces.cnet.com/8301-31045_1-10414355269.html?tag=mncol%3bmlt_related.
164 Stephen Williams, Pandora by the Dashboard Light, WHEELS BLOG (Dec. 11, 2009,
4:05 PM), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/pandora-by-the-dashboard-light/.
165 The iPhone has allowed personalized Internet radio to become “fully mobile.”
Jennifer Maerz, The Decade in Ideas: Local Artists, DJs, Studio Heads, and Tech Geeks
Discuss the Past and Present in Music, S. F. WEEKLY (Dec. 23, 2009),
http://www.sfweekly.com/2009-12-23/music/the-decade-in-ideas-local-artists-djs-studioheads-and-tech-geeks-discuss-the-past-and-present-in-music/.
166 Impact of Wireless Internet, supra note 158.
167 The Bridge Ratings First Look: The Future of Radio 2010, BRIDGE RATINGS
(Nov. 20,
2009),
http://www.bridgeratings.com/press.11.20.09.2012%20Listening%
20Trends.htm.
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traditional terrestrial radio has been considered the most
influential media source for consumers.168 It is clear that
Internet radio is driving the future of the radio broadcasting
industry, and although terrestrial radio will face new challenges
in competitive technology, it is certainly surviving as an
industry. If the purpose of copyright regulation is to encourage
innovation and “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,”169 Internet radio is disproportionately burdened with
royalty payments, and other broadcasting forms pay minimal
royalties for the music they play. Traditional terrestrial radio
has never and will never, in this author’s view, be sophisticated
enough to provide musical artists with any advertising perks able
to compete with the advanced advertising capabilities of
webcasting, and yet Internet radio continues to pay astronomical
royalty rates that are completely disproportionate to what
terrestrial broadcasters pay.
B. Terrestrial Radio Exemption: Unfair and Illogical
The current royalty rate system favors satellite and
terrestrial radio to the detriment of Internet radio. Although in
theory the structure is efficient and fair when considering the
differing levels of user interaction, “the standards used to derive
the royalties differ among classes of broadcasters, creating
ongoing controversy.”170 Webcasters pay royalties set according
to the willing buyer/willing seller standard,171 while satellite
radio services pay rates determined under a multifactor test set
forth in section 801(b) of the Copyright Act,172 and terrestrial

Id.
U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Parks, supra note 40, at 49.
See Duvall, supra note 67.
For satellite radio determinations, Copyright Royalty Judges must consider the
following objectives:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public;
(B) to afford the copyright owner a fair return for his or her creative work and
the copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions;
(C) to reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in
the product made available to the public with respect to relative creative
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and
contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media
for their communication;
(D) to minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries
involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2006). Additionally, the rates set may be adjusted to reflect
monetary inflation and other rate changes. § 801(b)(2).
168
169
170
171
172
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radio stations pay no sound recording performance right at all.173
In fact, terrestrial broadcasters only pay about 3.5% of revenue to
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.174
And, as of 2008, terrestrial radio still constituted a sixteen billion
dollar market.175
Scholars and webcasters have supported
platform parity,176 which is the notion that “all music services
subject to the sound recording performance royalty should pay a
royalty determined by the same standard, or perhaps even the
same royalty.”177 SoundExchange established the musicFIRST
Coalition in 2007,178 which has strongly advocated for broader
performance rights in the form of platform parity.179 Both the
House of Representatives and the Senate are considering current
versions of the original Performance Rights Act to establish
platform parity between radio broadcasters.180
An exemption for terrestrial broadcast radio to the detriment
of Internet radio no longer makes sense, especially when Internet
radio advances the interests of musical artists in ways that
terrestrial radio cannot. Although the exposure of new artists
and public access to music should never trump proper
compensation for copyright holders, “Internet radio is not the old
Napster.”181 File sharing constitutes the major cause for the
recent decline in CD sales, not Internet radio.182 In fact, Internet
radio has helped to increase artist’s revenues from digital
173 Parks, supra note 40, at 49; Tim Westergren, Important Update on Royalties,
PANDORA RADIO BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://blog.pandora.com/pandora/archives/2009/
07/important_updat_1.html; Alex Nesbitt, Future of Internet Radio, DIGITAL PODCAST
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.digitalpodcast.com/podcastnews/2009/10/08/future-of-internetradio-dmf.
174 Ty McMahan, Royalty Deal with Music Labels Renews Internet Radio, VENTURE
CAPITAL DISPATCH BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2009/07/07/
royalty-deal-with-music-labels-renews-internet-radio.
175 SNL Kagan Forecasts Advertising Revenue Recovery for TV and Radio Stations in
2010, ALLRADIONEWS.COM (June 14, 2010), http://allradionews.com/2010/06/14/snl-kaganforecasts-advertising-revenue-recovery-for-tv-and-radio-stations-in-2010/. The $16 billion
figure for 2008 represented a 17.7% drop from 2007, but radio revenue is projected to
recover to $17.1 billion in 2010. Id.
176 Platform parity has also been described as the “full performance right” in sound
recordings. See Parks, supra note 40, at 49.
177 David Oxenford, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Radio Performance
Royalty and Platform Parity for Webcaster Royalties, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Aug. 6, 2009,
8:45 PM),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/08/articles/broadcast-performanceroyalty/senate-judiciary-committee-hearing-on-radio-performance-royalty-and-platformparity-for-webcaster-royalties/. This was the idea behind the Performance Rights Act. See
supra note 128.
178 MUSICFIRST COALITION, http://www.musicfirstcoalition.org (last visited Oct. 6,
2010). “FIRST” is an acronym for “Fairness in Radio Starting Today.” Id.
179 Id.
180 See infra Part IV.A.
181 Spektor, supra note 12, at 87.
182 Castro, supra note 112, at 7.
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downloads in ways that terrestrial radio cannot.183 In 2006,
RadioParadise184 generated over $260,000 in sales of CDs and
other music through Amazon and $28,000 in iTunes
downloads.185 In part, these sales can be attributed to the fact
that on most webcasting stations, the artist’s name, song name,
and album name are displayed next to a purchase option, a
feature not available on terrestrial radio stations.186 In addition,
Internet radio gives airtime to lesser-known artists that are not
played on AM/FM radio, and therefore incentivizes artists to
create more music.187 With the numerous benefits Internet radio
provides to both the public and to musical artists, the unbalanced
royalty structure should be improved to include platform parity.
To compensate broadcasters for increased royalty payments
resulting from platform parity, it should be balanced with options
to reduce royalty fees.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT WITH
AN OPT-OUT DATABASE PROVISION
To address the unfairness of the current royalty structure,
which continues to favor terrestrial and satellite radio over
Internet radio, Congress should pass the new and revised
Performance Rights Act.188 However, the Act should be amended
to include an option for artists to opt-out of royalty payments by
registering with a government-run database. This way, artists
will be compensated no matter how their music is broadcasted,
and broadcasters can enjoy an efficient and streamlined way to
reduce royalty payments owed to owners of sound recording
copyrights.
A. The Full Performance Right Revisited
On February 4, 2009, a revived version of the original
Performance Rights Act189 was introduced into the Senate by
Senator Patrick Leahy.190
Known as “S. 379,” or the

See supra notes 14 & 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122.
Castro, supra note 112, at 8.
Devices like the iPad, which have large interactive screens, have been
revolutionary for music advertising. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
187 Spektor, supra note 12, at 81.
188 Performance Rights Act of 2009, S. 379, 111th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2009), 2009 CONG
US S 379 (Westlaw).
189 See supra note 128.
190 S. 379. There is also a version in the House of Representatives, introduced by
Representative Conyers. See H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2009), 2009 CONG US HR
848 (Westlaw). As of October 2010, the Act is still pending before Congress. S. 379:
183
184
185
186
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“Performance Rights Act,” it would amend the Copyright Act to
grant performers of sound recordings rights to compensation
from terrestrial broadcasters, but would establish a flat annual
fee in lieu of royalty payments for terrestrial broadcast stations
making less than $1.25 million in yearly revenue, a similar
standard to the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009.191 Because
the economy is currently in a downturn, the legislation will not
impose royalty payments until three years after enactment.192
On May 13, 2009, the House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee approved the bill,193 and the Senate Judiciary
Committee approved the same legislation in October of 2009.194
Next, the Senate must consider and vote on the legislation.
This new Performance Rights Act enjoys a considerable
amount of support,195 and should be adopted into law by
Congress. Although both Internet radio and terrestrial radio are
free to the consumer, Internet radio compensates performing
artists in the form of advertising in ways terrestrial radio does
not. These individuals should be compensated for their work,
regardless of the medium in which it is performed.196 Not
surprisingly, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)197
has vehemently opposed this legislation, calling it a “tax” on local
radio stations.198 The NAB claims that this tax would reduce the
variety that music radio stations play,199 but when one considers
Performance Rights Act, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s379/show
(last visited Oct. 4, 2010) [hereinafter S. 379 Performance Rights Act].
191 See supra Part II.B.
192 S. 379.
193 David Oxenford, Broadcast Performance Royalty Passes House Judiciary
Committee–—A Work in Progress, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (May 13, 2009),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/05/articles/broadcast-performance-royalty/
broadcast-performance-royalty-passes-house-judiciary-committee-a-work-in-progress/.
194 See S. 379: Performance Rights Act, supra note 190; Juliana Gruenwald, More
Support for Royalty Bill, NAT’L J. (Jan. 6, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://techdailydose.
nationaljournal.com/2010/01/more-support-for-royalty-bill.php.
195 Seventeen labor and civil rights organizations, including the AFL-CIO and the
NAACP, urged Congress to adopt the bill. See AFL-CIO, NAACP, Others Back
Performance Rights Act, MUSICFIRST (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.musicfirstcoalition.org/
node/728. Even the Intellectual Property division of the American Bar Association has
come out in support of the bill. See Gruenwald, supra note 194. However, there is
significant opposition to the bill as well, mainly from commercial television and radio
stations. See H.R. 848 – Performance Rights Act, MAPLIGHT.ORG, http://maplight.org/uscongress/bill/111-hr-848/358578/total-contributions (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (comparing
the interest groups in support of and in opposition to the bill, as well as the relative
financial contributions made by those groups to House members).
196 Castro, supra note 112, at 1.
197 NAT’L ASS’N OF BROADCASTERS, http://www.nab.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
198 See No Performance Tax, http://www.noperformancetax.org (last visited Oct. 5,
2010). This website is operated by the NAB. Id.
199 Radio at Risk, NO PERFORMANCE TAX, http://www.noperformancetax.com/Radio%
20at%20Risk (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
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the imminent rise of in-car Internet radio,200 these concerns may
not be so terrifying. Although terrestrial radio provides artists
with exposure to new audiences,201 this alone should not justify
an exemption when Internet radio gives similar—even better—
exposure.
The Performance Rights Act may have some negative
impacts on musicians and record companies,202 but it would at
least level the playing field of who pays royalties and create a
more balanced royalty structure. Moreover, “the proposed act
would result in additional revenue for record companies,
musicians, and performers . . . [who] would receive an additional
income stream. . . . [R]ecord companies could use the additional
revenue to invest more heavily in the creative process of music.203
The Act itself, however, does not address the issue of high royalty
rates. Therefore, the Performance Rights Act should carry with
it a simple way for webcasters and radio stations alike to reduce
their royalty payments.
B. An Opt-Out Database for SoundExchange
Since the CRB determination of royalty rates in 2007,204 it
has been assumed that artists could waive the collection of
royalties if they felt it would be in their best interest to allow
webcasters to play their music.205 SoundExchange currently
allows sound recording copyright owners to negotiate directly
See supra Part III.
At a House Judiciary Committee in 2007, congressmen on either side of the issue
of full performance rights agreed that terrestrial broadcasts have been positive for
musical artists. David Oxenford, House Judiciary Committee Hearing on Broadcast
Performance Right—No Breaks for the Broadcasters, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (July 31,
2007), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2007/07/articles/broadcast-performance-royalty/
house-judiciary-committee-hearing-on-broadcast-performance-right-no-breaks-for-thebroadcasters/#more.
202 Matthew Lasar, Performance Rights Act Might Shut Down Some Radio Stations,
ARS TECHNICA (June 8, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/
06/gao-report-performance-rights-act-might-shut-down-some-radio-stations.ars
(stating
that the act “could prompt some stations to make ‘adjustments’ . . . such as reducing staff
levels, switching to a nonmusic format, and ceasing operation”) (citing U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-428R, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT ON THE RECORDING AND
BROADCAST RADIO INDUSTRIES 12 (2010)).
203 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-428R, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT ON THE
RECORDING AND BROADCAST RADIO INDUSTRIES 4 (2010).
204 See supra Part II.A.
205 See David Oxenford, Music Waivers Dropped Amid Payola Allegations—What’s the
Impact for Future Waivers for Webcasters?, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (July 22, 2007),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2007/07/articles/payola-and-sponsorship-identif/musicwaivers-dropped-amid-payola-allegations-whats-the-impact-for-future-waivers-forwebcasters/.
200
201
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with webcasters, provided they give proper notice to the CRB and
to SoundExchange.206 Also, if an artist does not collect the
royalties owed to him after three years, SoundExchange keeps
the money and adds it back into the general revenue pool.207
SoundExchange needs its own streamlined system for efficient
use of royalty payments without requiring cumbersome
individual negotiations between webcasters and copyright
holders.
At a recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing concerning
performance royalties for radio, Texas Senator Cornyn suggested
that, “rather than compelling a performance royalty, Congress
should set up a ‘Do Not Play’ list, similar to a do not call list.” 208
Such a list would be kept by SoundExchange—which already has
a list of most copyright holders209—and would consist of those
artists who do not consent to their music being played without
the payment of a royalty.210 If webcasters and radio stations
wanted to play music from artists on the Do Not Play list, they
would have to negotiate individually, but stations could play
music from any other artists without a royalty.211 This idea,
however, was dismissed quickly during the hearing for legitimate
fears that such a system would tend to force less well-known
musical artists and groups into a race to the bottom—giving up
their copyrights in order to be heard—and that it would
simultaneously prove difficult for smaller radio stations to carry
major music stars, thus infringing on smaller sites’ ability to
compete with larger ones.212
However, the idea of creating a pool of royalty-free music is
interesting and might prove a successful method for lowering
royalty payments, which continue to cripple online radio stations.
Instead of the system allowing royalty-free music by default, as
Senator Comyn suggested, SoundExchange should create its own

206 Eliot Van Buskirk, Polka Players Want to Fold SoundExchange Royalties, WIRED
(July 19, 2007, 3:37 PM), http://www.wired.com/listening_post/2007/07/polka-players-w/.
207 Eliot Van Buskirk, Webcasting Royalties: A Modest Proposal, WIRED (July 23,
2007),
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/commentary/listeningpost/2007/07/
listeningpost_0723?currentPage=3. Van Buskirk suggests that, “[i]f SoundExchange is
going to collect royalties without being asked to, it should make it easy to opt out of that
system on a song-by-song basis.” Id.
208 Oxenford, supra note 177.
209 Performers and/or copyright owners must register with SoundExchange in order
to
“get
paid
when
[they]
get
played.”
Register,
SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://soundexchange.com/performer-owner/register-update-my-info/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2010).
210 Oxenford, supra note 177.
211 Id.
212 Id.
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“Please Play” or “opt out” list, where artists could waive the
payment of royalties and consent to webcasters and radio
broadcasters playing their music for free. This opt-out provision
could easily be attached to the Performance Rights Act as an
amendment and simply provide a method for broadcasters to
mitigate the impact of platform parity. Such a system, operated
by SoundExchange, would provide more artists with more
security and discretion in choosing how to market themselves,
and it would also create more revenue as users are prompted
with a “Purchase” option next to the song played. Instead of
requiring individual negotiations, artists could simply join the
opt-out list, which would allow radio stations of all types to play
the music without paying royalties.
Some artist communities, like the Polka America
Corporation (PAC),213 have already given Internet radio stations
the right to play their music without royalties.214 However, PAC
had to create its own artist database without the help of
SoundExchange.215 Requiring webcasters to negotiate individually with music and recording organizations is as inefficient
as requiring them to negotiate with individual music artists.
With the right governmental protections in place, a system,
operated by SoundExchange, would streamline negotiations
between webcasters and sound recording copyright holders, as
well as create an efficient way for webcasters to play free music
to lessen their royalty obligations under the Copyright Act. This,
coupled with a full performance right granted to holders of sound
recording copyrights in the Performance Rights Act, seems to
produce a fairer and more balanced structure that equally
considers the interests of all parties involved: musical artists, the
recording industry, webcasters, and terrestrial broadcasters.
CONCLUSION
The radio industry has changed dramatically over the past
decade, and continued adaptation and flexibility will be needed to
address future technological advances and evolving consumer
habits. As the actions of Radiohead demonstrated in 2007, the
market is changing, and everyone—musicians, music publishers,

213 POLKA AMERICA CORPORATION, http://www.polkaamericacorporation.org/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010).
214 Van Buskirk, supra note 206. Polka artists interested in joining the opt-out
database must register with the Polka America Corporation, and then their music will be
played for free on any webcaster or terrestrial radio broadcaster that plays more than
fifty percent polka music. Id.
215 Id.
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performers, etc.—will need to get creative to stay in business.
Internet radio represents the innovative forefront of the
broadcasting industry. Therefore, a royalty regulation system
that hinders technological advancement and ignores current
consumer values is detrimental to the health of the music
industry as a whole. It is not appropriate to allow terrestrial
radio stations to pay nothing in royalties while webcasters must
pay at least twenty-five percent in revenue. Indeed, “[c]opyright
may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of
regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms
others. When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches.
When done wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat
competitors.”216 Congress should pass the Performance Rights
Act, but should amend it slightly so that it includes an opt-out
database requirement for SoundExchange in order to balance the
interests of all parties.
The “great irony” of the debates among these groups—
webcasters, the recording industry, musical artists, etc.—is that
“most new devices only become popular because buyers really
want them, which means they open whole new markets that can
then be monetized by rightsholders.”217 Copyright holders have
been forced to accept industry-altering technology before, and
have successfully met the challenge. Consider the gramophone,
the VCR, and analog cassette tapes.
Each time these
technologies were introduced into the market, copyright holders
feared that it would be the death of music.218 Each time the
industry survived. The recording industry will survive into the
digital age, but only if it accepts change once again and adapts
with new business and finance models.

216 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 194 (2004). This book measures
the effect of the Internet on various aspects of our culture, including film, performance,
radio, and television. Examining the relationship between what Professor Lessig calls
“piracy” and “property,” he argues that, by bowing to the demands of media
conglomerates, the government has allowed the law to hamper the innovations of the
Internet and thus hinder culture’s ability to respond to change as we have always done—
using “common sense.” Id. at 13.
217 Nate Anderson, 100 Years of Big Content Fearing Technology—In Its Own Words,
ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 11, 2009, 11:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/10/
100-years-of-big-content-fearing-technologyin-its-own-words.ars/2.
218 Id.

